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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS
To ENTERTAIN ACTIONS ARISING ouT OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONs-Relator
was the losing candidate in an election for the office of Representative to
the United States Congress. He commenced proceedings in the House, pursuant to statute,1 contesting the seating of his opponent, and petitioned
the Minnesota Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain the Minnesota Secretary of State from issuing a certificate of election until the contest was
finally determined. Relator based his petition on a Minnesota statute2
which provides that the Secretary of State may not issue a certificate of
election in case of a contest until it has been determined by the proper
court. A temporary injunction and order to show cause were directed to the
Secretary of State, requiring him to appear and answer relator's petition.
Relator's opponent in the election entered as respondent. On final hearing,
held, writ vacated, two justices concurring specially. The Minnesota statute
does not apply to a contest instituted in the House of Representatives; state
courts are constitutionally divested of jurisdiction to entertain cases contesting congressional elections.3 Odegard v. Olson, 119 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.
1963).

Article I, section 4, of the Constitution submits to the legislatures4 of
the states the power to prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner" of electing
their senators and representatives in Congress.5 It reserves to Congress the

U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
(1962).
3 The reasoning of constitutional divestment was implied in the majority opinion.
The concurring justices agreed that the Minnesota statute does not apply, but rejected
the implication that the Constitution divests courts of jurisdiction to entertain such
cases. Principal case at 721-23.
4 For interpretations of the meaning of "legislature," see Commonwealth ex Tel.
Dummit v. O'Connell, 298 Ky. 44, 181 S.W.2d 691 (1944); 30 HAR.v. L. REv. 184 (1917).
5 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 59 (Hamilton).
1 REv. STAT. § 105 (1875), 2
2 MINN. STAT. ANN, § 204.32
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right to make or alter such regulations, except as to places of choosing
senators.6 The authority conferred is concurrent, and, unless there is an
inconsistency, regulation by Congress of certain particulars of the elective
process does not void state regulation of other particulars.7 Although state
regulation is thus subject to alteration by Congress, the area has been left
almost entirely to the states.8 For the most part, there has been little conflict concerning this dual control.9 However, a variance of opinion has
arisen among the courts as to when this concurrent power conflicts with the
exclusive power of Congress to judge the elections of its members.10 While
the courts have been unanimous in holding that Congress is the sole judge
of its members' elections and that no judgment by a state court or decision
of a state official would be binding on that body,U they have differed in
determining when state jurisdiction over elections ends and exclusive congressional jurisdiction begins.
In the principal case, the majority of the court, although it based its
decision on interpretation of a statute, impliedly held that state courts are
constitutionally divested of jurisdiction to entertain any action by a defeated congressional candidate contesting the election. The Minnesota
court in several earlier cases has stated that which it implied in the principal case,12 and a number of other jurisdictions have so held. Thus, relief
has been refused in actions to have a state court determine who received the
highest vote total,13 to have a recount ordered, 14 or to have a candidate declared disqualified for violating a state corrupt practices act. 15 Courts which
6 The exception for places of choosing Senators was inserted because the state
legislatures originally elected them. Since the adoption of the seventeenth amendment,
there seems to be no reason for continuing the exception; however, it has not been
deleted.
7 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
s "Although Congress has had this power of regulating the conduct of congressional
elections from the organization of the Government . . . it has been its policy to leave
such regulations almost entirely to the States, whose representatives Congressmen are."
United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 482 (1917); accord, Voltaggio v. Caputo, 210
F. Supp. 337 (D.N.J. 1962).
9 In the early decades of this century, a question arose as to whether federal election
laws extended to primary elections. See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
It was eventually determined that primaries were such elections as were within the
congressional power. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); cf. Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944).
10 "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of
its own Members ..•." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5.
11 E.g., Keogh v. Homer, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934); Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146
Ore. 439, 30 P.2d 1037 (1934); State ex rel. McDill v. Board of State Canvassers, 36
Wis. 498 (1874).
12 Youngdale v. Eastvold, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N.W.2d 459 (1950); Williams v. Maas,
198 Minn. 516, 270 N.W. 586 (1936); State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212
N.W. 604 (1927). Chief Justice Knutson, author of the opinion in the Youngdale case,
qualified that holding in his concurring opinion in the principal case.
13 Williams v. Maas, supra note 12.
14 Belknap v. Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1893).
15 State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); Sutherland
v. Miller, 79 W. Va. 796, 91 S.E. 993 (1917).
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have so held have considered the processes of election completed when the
various canvassing boards have performed their statutory duties and certified the results to the appropriate state official. 16 They have not considered
the certification of winning candidates an integral part of the election
processes over which the states have control. Rather, they have viewed certification as involving purely ministerial duties, affording no discretion to
the courts or to the officials charged with performance.17
This position is probably founded upon broad policy bases, rather than
a feeling that any further extension of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional.18 In the first place, it is desirable to secure prompt issuance of the
certificates of election, so that public business can continue with as little
delay as possible. By refusing to grant relief to candidates after the elections, except to order certification of the apparent winner, the courts have
sought to avoid granting discretion to officials charged with ministerial
tasks. The certainty that such officials will be ordered to issue the certificates,
even if a contest is pending, no doubt eliminates some unnecessary delay.
Another factor possibly influencing some state courts toward this position
is a feeling that, since Congress is the final judge, a decision by a court
would be a vain and unnecessary act. 19
Other courts have seen the provisions of article I, section 4, as giving
the states a more extended jurisdiction over congressional elections.20 While
acknowledging that Congress is the final judge of the elections of its members, these courts have seen no constitutional problems in assuming jurisdiction over election disputes. They have, however, exhibited reluctance
to assume jurisdiction beyond the point where the certificate has been issued and the candidate sworn in. 21 Behind the holdings of courts which
have adopted this broader view of state authority, there are also several
considerations. First, since the issuance of a certificate of election creates a
prima fade right in the recipient,22 they feel it should register the true re16 In making their determination of whether the States are without jurisdiction,
the courts often regard the completion of the "election processes" as determinative
of the issue. E.g., principal case at 721 (concurring opinion).
17 It should be noted that even those courts which have held that the Constitution
divests them of jurisdiction have entertained actions to in mandamus to require
state officials to issue the certificates. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford, 28
Fla. 441, 10 So. ll8 (1891); Britt v. Board of Canvassers, 172 N.C. 797, 90 S.E. 1005
(1916).
18 See generally Martin, Changing Election Returns by Writs of .Mandamus, 10
BENCH &: BAR (n.s.) 450 (1916).
10 ''It would ... be 'officious and nugatory.' " Principal case at 720.
20 See People ex rel. Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 216 N.Y. 732, ll0 N.E. 776
(1915); Wickersham v. State Election Bd., 357 P.2d 421 (Okla. 1960); McDill v. Board
of State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 498 (1874).
21 "No certificate of election has yet been issued to either candidate. . . • If it had
already been issued, and the representative sworn in as a member, there would arise
a different situation, involving different questions, on which we do not attempt to
pass.'' People ex rel. Brown v. Suffolk County, supra note 20, at 733-34, ll0 N.E. at 777.
22 People ex rel. Brown v. Suffolk County, supra note 20; 2 CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 1413 (8th ed. 1927). Contra, principal case at 720, where the court stated that
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sult. Although Congress is not bound to admit the holder of a certificate,
a candidate certified as elected has an initial advantage in claiming the
right to hold office. The majority of the court in the principal case expressed a feeling that to grant injunctive relief would be to grant one of the
candidates a tactical advantage.23 Since failure to grant such relief carries
the same peril, it would seem preferable to visit the disadvantage upon the
candidate held to be not legally elected. This result could be guaranteed
only by the assumption of jurisdiction to hear election controversies.
A second consideration supporting the broader view of state authority
over election contests is that the fact finding of a court in such a proceeding
would provide very useful information for consideration by Congress should
any contest be instituted in that body.24 It seems highly unlikely Congress
would consider a court's determination "officious and nugatory," as the
principal case suggested.25 In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized
in an early case the informational value a state court finding would have.26
That case arose out of an election for a seat in the state legislature rather
than Congress, but the Minnesota Constitution also contains a provision
making the state legislature the judge of its members' elections.27 The court,
reversing a lower court dismissal, held that relief could be given. It pointed
out that this merely provided a convenient means of preparing and securing evidence, and, since the legislature would not be bound by the findings,
there was no conflict with the constitutional provision.
The justices who specially concurred in the decision in the principal
case stated that they believed the broader view of the constitutionality of
state jurisdiction was the more sound. It was their opinion that the court
was not precluded by the Constitution from exercising jurisdiction, but
was precluded by the lack of a state recount statute. A recount statute,
they felt, was necessary before a state court could assume jurisdiction over
a controversy arising out of an election. Only one court has so held,28 and
the soundness of this position is questionable. Such a statute is no doubt
essential when recount is the relief asked, but it would seem to have little
relevance when injunctive or declaratory relief is requested.
There seems to be little, if any, basis for holding that a constitutional
prohibition prevents state courts from entertaining this type of case. Article
I, section 5, does not expressly preclude the states or their courts from
exercising jurisdiction over election controversies. It could, in fact, be
a certificate of election is merely a publication by the Secretary of State of the official action
of the canvassing board.
Principal case at 720.
See People ex rel. Brown v. Suffolk County, 216 N.Y. 732, llO N.E. 776 (1915);
cf. State ex rel. Haines v. Searle, 59 Minn. 489, 61 N.W. 553 (1894).
25 See note 19 supra.
20 State ex rel. Haines v. Searle, 59 Minn. 489, 61 N.W. 553 (1894). Contra, Ellison
v. Barnes, 23 Utah 183, 63 Pac. 899 (1901).
27 MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 3.
28 Wickersham v. State Election Bd., 537 P .2d 421 (Okla. 1960) (dictum).
28
24
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viewed as conferring a concurrent power, with the paramount authority
resting with Congress, much as with article I, section 4.29 Moreover, since
certificates of election are not required by the Constitution or federal
statute, but are provided for by the states,ao it would seem the courts
should have jurisdiction to determine whether a candidate is entitled to
receive one under the applicable election laws. As a determination of who
is entitled to a certificate is not equivalent to a final determination of who
is entitled to a seat in Congress, state courts, by deciding the former question, would not be infringing the power of Congress.
Even if the broader view is taken, at some point it must be said the
states no longer have jurisdiction. The proper place to draw the line
which is called for would be after the certification of the apparent winner.81
Since certification is the last election process provided by the states, any
proceeding after certification would, in reality, be one to try title to office.
The statutory remedy of a contest in the House82 is, at that point, the only
proper one.88 By taking the narrower view, the majority in the principal
case has apparently left Minnesota congressional candidates with no remedy
in the state courts. If the view of the concurring justices is adopted in a
future case, candidates will still be without a state remedy, at least until
the legislature enacts a recount statute covering congressional elections. Nevertheless, the court is not bound to either holding in the principal case, for
the relator based his petition for relief on a state statute,34 which the court
held inapplicable. Should the court retreat from its earlier holdings311 on
the constitutional question, as the concurring justices argued it should, a
future petitioner seeking non-statutory relief might be successful.
C. Douglas Kranwinkle

29 The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Knutson seems to support this view.
See principal case at 721.
ao See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204.!12 (1962).
31 See cases cited note 20 supra.
32 R.Ev. STAT. § 105 (1875), 2 U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
83 When title to office is the real point in issue, a proceeding in the nature of
quo warranto is proper. Such an action will not be entertained when the court could
not give judgment of ouster. See HIGH, ExTRAORDINAR.Y LEGAL REMEDIES 88, 600 (8d ed.
1896).

34 MINN. STAT. ANN, § 204.32 (1962).
35 See cases cited note 12 supra.

